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SKYJACKERS, JACKALS AND SOLDIERS: BRITISH PLANNING FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE 1970S. 
 
 
 
Word Count: 9,937 (including endnotes). 
 
Abstract: Following the Munich Olympics massacre of September 1972, the British government 
conducted a series of contingency plans to ensure that Whitehall, police constabularies and the 
armed forces were prepared for similar crises affecting the UK and its citizens. This article 
examines the evolution of British counterterrorist planning during the 1970s, which still shapes 
Whitehall’s crisis management procedures for responding to international terrorism, and also 
procedures for calling for military support. It demonstrates that whilst there are differences in the 
character of the terrorist threat forty years ago and today, there are also parallels between the 
practical and political challenges of counterterrorism in the era of the Baader-Meinhof and Carlos 
the Jackal, and the struggle against al-Qaeda and its affiliates today. 
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SKYJACKERS, JACKALS, AND SOLDIERS: BRITISH PLANNING FOR 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS DURING THE 1970s. 
 
 
 
On 5 January 1974 a column of 150 British Army troops, supported by armoured vehicles, 
arrived at Heathrow airport in full battle order, and over the course of the following two weeks 
they patrolled its runways and the perimeter. These soldiers had been ordered in by Edward 
Heath’s government in response to intelligence reports that the Palestinian fedayeen intended to 
use a portable anti-aircraft missile to shoot down a passenger jet, and the British authorities had 
already devised contingency plans (codenamed Operation Marmion) to deploy the Army in order 
to deter a terrorist attack at the airport.1 Marmion was implemented on three further occasions in 
1974 – in June, July and September – and in each case the troop presence at Heathrow attracted 
considerable parliamentary and press comment.2 Some critics argued that in each case the British 
government was over-reacting to the threat at hand, and the military patrols at Heathrow were 
essentially intended as a public relations exercise.3 However, Operation Marmion also had an 
effect which ministers and civil servants had not intended, as it fed contemporary fears that the 
British Army and right-wing extremists within the establishment and security services were 
preparing for a coup.4 
 
Much of the discussion about responses to terrorism in Britain focuses on the conflict in 
Northern Ireland (1969-1998), and there is very little scholarly analysis of how the British state 
responded to the threat of international terrorism from the early 1970s onwards; ‘international 
terrorism’ being defined here as the use of lethal violence by an array of non-state groups against 
several states and societies, in support of anti-systemic objectives (such as the destruction of 
capitalism or Western hegemony, or the restoration of a caliphate under supposedly pure Islamic 
principles).5 This is partly due to the Thirty Year rule regulating the release of government papers 
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into the UK National Archives, as a consequence of which primary source material from the 
1970s has only recently been made available to researchers. Although a considerable amount of 
primary source evidence remains closed at the time of writing, there is enough declassified 
documentation on this period for a preliminary study of this topic.6 An analysis of the 
counterterrorist policies of this period is of contemporary relevance, firstly because much of the 
planning and bureaucratic processes that are currently in place (notably the establishment of the 
Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) as the key co-ordinating body in any crisis), and the 
procedures for calling in military support for the civil authorities were devised in the 1970s. 
There are indeed clear parallels between Operation Marmion and the decision by Tony Blair to 
order a similar deployment of soldiers to Heathrow in February 2003 (and, for that matter, the 
criticisms that the Labour government subsequently received from the media).7 
 
A second point concerns the striking similarities between certain Palestinian and far-left 
non-state groups forty years ago, and their radical Islamist counterparts today. The first terrorist 
organisation to concurrently hijack four passenger aircraft was not al-Qaeda on 9/11, but the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) on 6 September 1970 (‘Skyjack Sunday’); a 
crucial difference being that the PFLP’s operation led to a prolonged hostage crisis, rather than 
mass murder.8 The PFLP leader George Habash, his former subordinate and rival Wadie Haddad, 
the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Venezuelan gun-for-hire Illich Ramirez Sanchez (better known as 
‘Carlos the Jackal’), and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) may have differed from al-Qaeda 
ideologically. Yet they shared a general hostility towards the West and capitalism, which led to a 
coalescence between them which anticipated John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt’s 2001 theory of 
‘netwar’ – of ‘dispersed organizations, small groups and individuals [which] communicate, 
coordinate and conduct their campaign in an internetted manner, without a precise central 
command’. Furthermore, in much the same way that al-Qaeda operated worldwide since its 
inception, the instigators of ‘Skyjack Sunday’ and the Munich Olympics atrocity recognised 
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no geographical restrictions to their operations. The plight of the Palestinian refugees 
would provide the pretext for a hijacking of a Swissair jet, or the killing of Puerto Rican 
pilgrims by Japanese terrorists in an Israeli airport.9 The international terrorist threat in the 
1970s therefore posed challenges distinct from those posed by the Provisional IRA and the 
Loyalist gangs in Northern Ireland, and the British official response is therefore worthy of our 
attention.   
 
This article describes how the British government developed its crisis management 
procedures to deal with terrorism during the 1970s, and also on the contingency plans it prepared 
to deal with likely emergencies affecting the UK’s national interests. It will focus principally on 
the role that the British armed forces played in counterterrorist preparations, and will also discuss 
the effect that political decisions had on civil society, most notably with reference to the common 
fear on the left that anti-terrorism provided the pretext for increased authoritarianism, and a 
possible military takeover. As such, this article is not only intended to set the context for the 
UK’s current counterterrorism strategy,10 but it also highlights the challenges of using armed 
forces as an anti-terrorist tool as far as both civil-military relations and civil liberties in a liberal 
democracy are concerned.  
  
 
The historical context: The police, the military and anti-terrorism. 
 
Since the establishment of the Metropolitan Police in 1829, the British model for internal law 
enforcement emphasises that society is policed by consent, that ‘the police are the public and the 
public are the police’, and that constables should employ the minimum force necessary in the 
preservation of law and order.11 In practice, this meant that the UK did not have a centralised 
gendarmerie to preserve internal order, and officers in England, Wales and Scotland were 
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unarmed when on routine duties.12 By the mid-1970s, there were specialised police units on the 
British mainland authorised and trained to carry arms and use lethal force. These included the 
Diplomatic Protection Group, the Special Patrol Group and the Firearms Unit of the Metropolitan 
Police (then known as D11, now SO19),13 the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Police formed in 1971 
to guard MOD facilities, and the UK Atomic Energy Agency Constabulary formed in 1955 to 
guard civil and military nuclear sites.14 British constabularies therefore did have a capacity to deal 
with emergencies such as the Balcombe Street siege in London (6-12 December 1975), in which 
the Metropolitan Police successfully resolved a hostage crisis involving four Provisional IRA 
gunmen, taking the latter into custody at its conclusion.15 
 
However, if the civil authorities lack the manpower or means to address a domestic crisis, 
the British government can request support from the armed forces, a term known as Military Aid 
to the Civil Authorities (MACA). If the police cannot preserve law and order the armed forces, in 
particular the British Army, can be required to provide Military Assistance to the Civil Power 
(MACP).16 During the 1970s MACP involved not only the prolonged and controversial 
counterterrorist campaign in Northern Ireland, but also preparations to use the armed forces – in 
particular elite units such as the 22nd Special Air Service Regiment (22SAS) and the Special Boat 
Service (SBS) – in the event of a terrorist attack in the UK. This was due not only to the stark 
contrast between the ethos of the British policing model and the potential need to use lethal 
violence to rescue hostages from terrorists (which the Bavarian police failed to do at Munich in 
September 1972), but the fact that police training emphasised containment rather than aggressive 
counter-action in the event of a hostage crisis, posing a particular challenge if ideologically-
inspired hostage-takers were unwilling to negotiate a peaceful resolution with the authorities.17 
 
The challenge of terrorism was not a new one for the British government, which had 
experienced insurgencies in its former colonies,18 and also acts of political violence committed by 
 6 
Irish Republicans and political radicals from the early 20th century onwards; the first example in 
which the army was called in to fight terrorists in a MACP role was arguably the ‘Siege of Sidney 
Street’ on 3 January 1911.19 Yet the emergence of international terrorism from the late 1960s 
posed a far different challenge from that of Republican and Loyalist para-militarism in Northern 
Ireland during the ‘Troubles’,20 and external hostage crises and aircraft hijackings posed unique 
difficulties for the UK government. The terrorist threat itself came from multiple groups drawn 
from the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and its rivals, and also far-leftists from 
Western Europe, Latin America and Japan. The PFLP, the JRA, the Baader-Meinhof and other 
movements trained with each other (notably in Palestinian fedayeen-run training camps in Jordan 
and (after 1970) Lebanon), and also conducted operations in concert or on each other’s behalf – 
prime examples include the JRA’s gun and grenade attack against passengers at Lod Airport in 
Israel (31 May 1972) and the PFLP’s hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 181 (13-17 October 1977), 
which was intended to force the German government to release the Baader-Meinhof’s leadership 
from prison.21  
 
Furthermore, the groups involved received training, weaponry and intelligence from state 
sponsors. The KGB and its Warsaw Pact counterparts supported Palestinian and extreme-left 
European movements, although it is worth noting that the British intelligence services did not 
subscribe to the conspiracy theory which presented international terrorism as part of a global 
Soviet conspiracy to undermine the West, ascribing more opportunistic reasons for Soviet bloc 
assistance to the PLO and other organisations.22 Of greater importance were Arab sponsors such 
as Iraq, Syria and Libya, whose provision of sanctuary to hard-line Palestinian groups that 
opposed peace with Israel presented a serious obstacle for Western governments.23 In Northern 
Ireland MI5, the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the British Army operated on home ground when 
it came to running intelligence operations against the Provisional IRA and other paramilitary 
groups, and also benefited from close co-operation with their Irish counterparts. In contrast, as 
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one senior MI5 officer noted in a letter to the then-Home Secretary, Robert Carr, in early 
September 1972:  
 
We do not control directly the amount or the quality of intelligence we receive about Arab 
terrorist plans and intentions. The planning of such operations is undertaken in highly secure 
conditions in the Middle East. Because of this tight security the intelligence we receive from 
friends and liaison services … is usually imprecise as regards targets, timing and the 
identities of those involved.24  
 
A further problem was that the UK was obliged to be reactive politically. Whilst successive 
governments were in a position to address the causes of terrorist violence in Northern Ireland 
through a long-term policy of enacting reforms addressing the institutionalised discrimination of 
the Catholic community, the factors that encouraged recruits for the movements engaged in 
international terrorism – the Israel-Palestine conflict, US foreign policy, and inchoate anger 
against ‘imperialism and ‘capitalism’ – were beyond resolution or indeed influence by the British 
government, or indeed any other Western power. The comparisons with the causes of Islamist 
terrorism today require no further comment.  
 
 Furthermore, the tactics employed by international terrorists – the hijacking of passenger 
jets, airport attacks and hostage crises– took advantage of the communications revolution of the 
late 20th century, exploiting both the increasing affordability of air travel and also the growth of 
television media. This meant that major terrorist incidents (such as Skyjack Sunday, Munich 
1972, and the seizure of OPEC Ministers at their summit in Vienna in December 1975) gained the 
perpetrators a global audience, put public pressure on governments to respond to crises in which 
their citizens were under threat,25 and also made terrorism a source of popular fascination, evident 
in sensationalist press reports, and also in films and novels inspired by real-life events.26 Aircraft 
hijackings were not a new phenomenon, as there had been a spate of incidents in the 1960s in 
which passenger jets were taken over either by criminals or by armed dissidents fleeing their own 
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countries.27 Yet whereas in previous instances crew and passengers were usually released once 
the plane had landed, practitioners of skyjacking like the PFLP would hold hostages and threaten 
to execute them if there demands were not met. Hijackers also tended to divert captured planes to 
states where either the host government was sympathetic to their cause, as was the case with 
Entebbe in 1976, or to a location where a hostage rescue operation would be hampered by 
diplomatic and political factors.28 
 
 British officials did nonetheless benefit from the increased co-operation between the 
Western states and other governments (notably those of Japan, Israel, and pro-Western Arab 
states) during the course of the 1970s, most notably in the form of intelligence-sharing and the 
dissemination of tactics and techniques related to counterterrorist operations.29 To take one 
example, the information that provoked the January 1974 Heathrow alert appears to have been 
provided by a Middle Eastern intelligence service which had close ties with its British 
counterparts. The likelihood is that this was either the Israeli Mossad or the Jordanian 
Mukhabarat, either of which would have had more effective informants amongst the Palestinian 
fedayeen than either MI5 or the Secret Intelligence Service would have possessed.30  
 
 
COBR and Pagoda: 1972-1979: 
 
Prior to September 1972 the British authorities did not treat international terrorism as an urgent 
problem. This was partly due to the Conservative government’s reluctance to increase military 
involvement in domestic security (particularly given the industrial disputes that affected the 
country at that time), but also a belief that the PFLP and allied groups were a problem for Israel, 
rather than the UK. 31 In retrospect, the 1970 skyjack crisis – in particular the seizure of a British 
airliner en route from Mumbai to London on 9 September – should have made Heath and his 
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ministers recognise that hijackers no longer respected national boundaries, particularly because 
Britain was forced to release a PLFP cadre, Leila Khaled, from police custody. Whilst there were 
contingency plans to send troops to UK airports in the event of a gun attack against a plane, and 
MI5 was tasked with reviewing airport security after the Lod massacre, the British government 
took no measures to prepare for a major attack before the Munich Olympics.32  
 
 The taking of Israeli athletes by ‘Black September’ on 5 September 197233 – and the 
disastrous failure of the German hostage rescue attempt the following morning – caused 
widespread alarm in Whitehall, and early the following month the Cabinet Office established its 
Working Group on Terrorist Activities  to devise a cross-governmental strategy for dealing with a 
similar incident in the UK. The Working Group was chaired by the Home Office, and 
incorporated the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), MOD, MI5, the Department of 
Trade and both the Metropolitan and Essex Police forces (respectively responsible for the security 
of Heathrow and Stansted airports). Its task was to learn lessons from Munich and other 
atrocities, prepare contingency plans for terrorist incidents in Britain, devise crisis management 
procedures and delineate departmental areas of responsibility in advance, and resolve any legal 
and tactical challenges involved which could arise from police or military intervention. Two days 
after Munich, the commanding officer of 22SAS, Lieutenant Colonel Peter de la Billiere, received 
a telephone call from the MOD’s Director of Military Operations, Major General Bill Scotter, 
relaying an enquiry from the prime minister about the army’s capacity for counterterrorism. De la 
Billiere’s adjutant, Captain Andrew Massey, had already written a paper recommending that 
22SAS set up a specialist hostage rescue unit, and this provided the basis for the regiment’s anti-
terrorist troop, codenamed Pagoda.34  
 
One of the key conclusions that both MI5 and 22SAS drew from Munich was that the 
Black September gunmen were able to massacre their hostages because the Bavarian police were 
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completely untrained and unequipped to mount a rescue operation.35 For the Working Group and 
the army, the key lesson was that in an analogous situation where terrorists were holding captives 
in a fixed location and were threatening to kill them, any military raid to rescue the latter had to 
be conducted with speed, aggression and overwhelming force. As Massey frankly noted in his 
report, ‘[the] use of shock tactics [to free hostages] is certain to produce violence scenes 
abhorrent to the public eye, and likely to provoke unfavourable press reaction’. There was 
therefore a clear understanding in Whitehall that the SAS would shoot to kill hostage-takers in the 
event of a Munich-style crisis, and that the role of a police cordon would not just be to contain the 
incident and prevent terrorists from escaping, but to ensure that any inquisitive members of the 
press or public did not get to see the grisly aftermath of a military assault.36  
 
Contingency plans for hostage-rescue represented just one aspect of the government 
response, as did the preparations to send regular troops to Heathrow and other airports to deter 
terrorist attacks (initially known as Marmion, by 1979 there were two separate plans for military 
intervention at Gatwick (Black Diamond) and Heathrow (Trustee)).37 The main task of the 
Working Group on Terrorist Activities was to ensure that in the event of a major incident the 
British authorities were prepared in advance, rather than following an improvised process of crisis 
management similar to that which had failed at Munich. The Working Group’s plans, which were 
endorsed by ministers, made the Home Secretary the lead official in managing the counter-
terrorist response, using the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR) both as a command post and 
as a means of co-ordinating the various government departments. In the event of a hostage crisis 
the processes of negotiating with the terrorists and planning for a rescue were to be conducted 
separately but concurrently. The police were in charge of containing the incident, cordoning off 
the terrorists and their captives, and also keeping the media clear of the scene (another lesson 
from Munich, where camera crews filmed officers preparing to storm the Israeli quarters in the 
Olympic Village, compromising the effort to rescue the captive athletes in the process). Both MI5 
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and the police were tasked with intelligence-gathering, while the Chief Constable could, with the 
Home Secretary’s approval, call in the SAS Pagoda troop as part of MACP if negotiations 
reached an impasse and the lives of the hostages were threatened. These plans initially 
concentrated on managing terrorist incidents at British airports (with planning to call in support 
from 22SAS being codenamed Operation Snowdrop),38 but it provided the template for resolving 
similar emergencies across the British mainland, and the COBR model of crisis management 
remained unchanged despite changes in government occurring during this period (with Labour 
gaining office in March 1974, and the Conservatives returning in May 1979).39  
 
 Declassified records show that COBR first ran an ‘alert procedure exercise’ in February 
1973, which dealt with a simulated hijacking of a passenger jet flying into UK air space. The first 
simulation to rehearse the government’s ‘response to a full-scale terrorist incident’, codenamed 
Icon, was held at Stansted airport on 10 April 1973, and the following January COBR held 
another unnamed exercise, with the contingency being the takeover of an embassy in London.40 
These simulations enabled the Cabinet Office to identify potential flaws in advance, most notably 
by preparing a communications plan (known as Orcades) between police and military 
commanders on the ground, and also between the government departments.41 In conjunction with 
COBR’s preparations, the SAS’s Pagoda troop repeatedly trained to storm a series of targets – 
aircraft, buses, train carriages and buildings – according to a variety of likely hostage-taking 
scenarios. In contrast with the financial austerity affecting other government expenditure, 
including defence, ‘money was no problem’ as far as the establishment and training of the 
Pagoda troop was concerned. Yet 22SAS was overstretched by its commitment of manpower to 
the counter-insurgency war in Dhofar, Oman, and also (after January 1976) its deployment to 
Northern Ireland. By 1979 Pagoda consisted of two troops (20 men) in addition to a small 
command group.42 There was also considerable disquiet within the Home Office and police forces 
about using 22SAS in domestic interventions, although Lt Col de la Billiere responded by 
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inviting English, Scottish and Welsh Chief Constables to the Regiment’s headquarters near 
Hereford, beginning a process of briefing and liaison which helped ease police-military relations. 
As far as domestic intelligence-gathering was concerned MI5’s F Branch provided the lead, 
although the Security Service’s priorities involved combating Soviet bloc espionage and 
supporting the military effort in Northern Ireland; the official history of MI5 estimates that the 
Middle Eastern and related terrorist threat absorbed only 3% of the service’s efforts.43 
 
 Before the Iranian Embassy siege (30 April-5 May 1980) COBR was not tested in 
earnest, and whilst the Provisional IRA did conduct a mainland bombing campaign in the mid-
1970s there were comparatively few terrorist incidents connected to the Palestinian or 
international far-left groups. Exceptions included the attempted assassination of Joseph Sieff (the 
Vice President of the British Zionist Federation) by Carlos on 30 December 1973, and the 
hijacking of a British Airways flight from London to Brunei, which was diverted to Tunis (21-25 
November 1974); the Tunisians were able to resolve the crisis which ended with the skyjackers’ 
surrender. A domestic flight from Manchester to London was hijacked on 7 January 1975, but the 
gunman involved was a mentally-unstable Iranian émigré rather than a hardened terrorist, and he 
was quickly arrested after the plane was diverted to land at Stansted.44 However, the authorities 
had to plan for the likelihood of attacks on British soil not just because of the threat that 
Palestinian groups and their sympathisers posed towards Israeli and Jordanian targets (such 
embassies, aircraft and commercial facilities) and the British Jewish community (as demonstrated 
by the attempt on Sieff’s life), but also because internecine feuds between rival Palestinian 
factions – notably Fatah and the Abu Nidal Organisation – and their patrons – Syria, Iraq and 
Libya – could lead to internecine feuds being prosecuted within the Arab émigré and diplomatic 
community in the UK. Foreign ‘spectaculars’ such as the gun attack on passengers at Rome’s 
Leonardo Da Vinci airport (17 December 1973) and Carlos’ rocket attack against aircraft at Orly, 
Paris (13 January 1975) also indicated the potential for similar acts against UK targets.45  
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 However, during the course of the decade there were two gaps in counterterrorist 
planning that needed to be addressed. The first involved crisis management measures for 
maritime emergencies, most notably involving the oil and natural gas facilities in the North Sea. 
The second – as demonstrated by the hijackings of Air France Flight 139 (27 June 1976) and 
Lufthansa Flight 181 (13 October 1977) – was whether the UK could respond decisively to an 
overseas crisis in which the lives of its citizens were at stake, even if this meant conducting the 
hostage rescue missions the Israeli Sayeret Matkal and the German GSG-9 carried out on foreign 
soil in Entebbe, Uganda, and Mogadishu, Somalia.  
 
 
Maritime counter-terrorist planning: 
 
The perceived risks of attacks against British shipping led the Royal Navy to prepare contingency 
plans for searching vessels in UK ports for explosives (codenamed Mendon), and on 17 May 
1972 a team of SBS marines and an Army ordnance expert were dropped by parachute into the 
Atlantic near the Queen Elizabeth II to search the liner in response to a bomb threat (which 
subsequently proved to be a hoax).46 Intelligence warnings of an attack on the QEII during its 
cruise to Israel in April-May 1973 (to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of Israeli independence) 
led the Heath government to authorise the deployment of a ‘response force’ of Royal Marines in 
plain clothes during the vessel’s voyage. The QEII’s trip to Israel proved uneventful, which was 
presumably of considerable relief to the FCO officials fretting about the possible diplomatic 
implications of a shootout between marines and Arab hijackers.47 The British authorities also felt 
obliged to plan for a potential terrorist attack directed against a key economic asset for the UK, 
the oil and gas fields of the North Sea. This proved to be a far more complicated process than the 
contingency preparations for an emergency on land. 
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 The first problem was to decide which government agency had primary oversight for the 
safety of the oil and gas sites. The Department of Energy was ultimately responsible for their 
oversight, the Department of Trade for maritime trade safety, the Home Office for co-ordinating 
counter-terrorist responses (MI5 was responsible to liaising with the energy companies about 
their security arrangements), and the MOD for MACA and also defence against external attack. 
The Scottish Office also had an institutional interest in the Northern fields, whilst Norway was 
responsible for the protection of rigs and pipelines in their own territorial waters.48 The second 
challenge was to determine what type of response the UK government needed to take towards a 
largely hypothetical threat. The Joint Intelligence Committee assessment on the risks of attack (by 
an Arab group, or the Provisional IRA, or the somewhat ineffectual ‘Tartan Army’ of Scottish 
nationalists) stated that ‘[because] of difficulties of access, including adverse weather conditions, 
the installations [at sea] will generally be less attractive than onshore installations’, although it 
highlighted the vulnerability of pipelines and unmanned gas plants to sabotage.49 With 570 
economic key points to protect across the UK, and given the parlous state of the national 
economy, total defence was impossible.50 
 
 The third problem officials Whitehall faced was to decide where the final responsibility 
for protecting the oil and gas fields from terrorist attack ultimately lay. The Home Office insisted 
that the English and Scottish constabularies with North Sea shorelines did not have the capacity 
to police or patrol the oil and gas platforms, lacking the ships, helicopters and specialist training 
required. Its officials also insisted that, despite the terms of the 1964 Police Act and the 1974 
Continental Shelf Act, constabularies were not under any statutory obligation to extend their 
jurisdiction offshore.51 The MOD, for its part, argued that the three armed services were 
overstretched, and senior civil servants and military officers suspected that the Royal Navy and 
Royal Air Force (RAF) in particular could find its vessels and aircraft – particularly Search and 
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Rescue helicopters – being repeatedly called upon under MACA rules to deal with minor 
incidents (such as accidental damage or industrial disputes) which fell well short of a terrorist 
attack. In legal terms, the MOD also argued that only the police had the authority to gain access 
to oil and gas installations when ‘dealing with serious crime or public order’, and that unless there 
was specific intelligence justifying a deployment it was illegal to permanently commit soldiers or 
marines to defend North Sea rigs. The military Chiefs of Staff also emphasised that the SAS 
Pagoda troop was too small to be committed to both land and maritime anti-terrorist 
interventions, and also emphasised that in the context of expected budget cuts expected in the 
1975 defence review the MOD could ill afford an extended domestic counterterrorist role.52 
 
 This debate was eventually resolved with a meeting of the Ministerial Committee on 
Terrorism on 17 December 1975, chaired by the then-Home Secretary Roy Jenkins. It involved 
established MACA/MACP procedures, making coastal constabularies responsible for the 
protection of onshore and offshore facilities, and also implementing the same processes of crisis 
management via the Home Secretary and COBR which had been already devised to deal with an 
onshore crisis. As far as initial jurisdiction was concerned, the Home Office ruled that the 
response to any incident ‘should come from the [constabulary] responsible for the port from 
which the [threatened] installation is operated’. In the event of a land-based terrorist incident the 
Chief Constable concerned was in a position to request assistance from the Pagoda troop.53 Both 
the navy and the RAF were also specifically allotted deterrence roles to complement their existing 
duties of territorial defence – the RAF’s Nimrod maritime reconnaissance aircraft incorporating 
over-flights of the North Sea rigs as part of their normal patrolling duties, whilst the Royal Navy 
had five Island-class patrol vessels and nine Ton-class mine-sweepers to complement RAF 
reconnaissance flights. The SBS’s own training in combat diving, parachuting, and covert 
insertion by small boat or submarine made it the obvious choice for any operations to recover 
either a hijacked vessel in UK territorial waters, or a British-flagged ship captured by terrorists in 
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international waters. The Royal Marines were also tasked with establishing a specialist unit to 
recapture any oil rig held by armed opposition, known as Commachio Company, which was 
operational by 1980.54 
 
 As was the case with land-based scenarios from Icon onwards, the declassified 
documents show that COBR ran exercises which combined ‘command post’ simulations and live 
training for military units. On 5-6 July 1976 COBR ran Purple Oyster, which incorporated both 
an interdepartmental war game involving the MOD, MI5, the Scottish Office, FCO and Grampian 
Police, and also a live exercise to scale an oil rig for the SBS and marines. Up until 1979 at least 
one Purple Oyster exercise was held annually, alongside three Prawn Salads (involving training 
for a helicopter assault by the Royal Marines on a captured platform) and one Pink Mussel (in 
which SBS divers practiced covert insertion techniques from a submarine).55 These exercises 
were particularly important for the SBS, not only to practice to scale and storm a target at sea, but 
also to mitigate the considerable risks involved in combat diving, in which carelessness or an 
equipment failure could endanger the lives of its operatives.56 
 
 
Liaison and planning for external interventions: 
 
The challenges of counter-terrorism could be mitigated by international co-operation, and the 
British and Norwegian governments co-ordinated security measures for the protection of the 
North Sea. The Federal German counterterrorist squad GSG-9 had close ties with 22SAS, and 
during the seizure of Lufthansa 181 by the PFLP GSG-9’s founder and commander, Colonel 
Ulrich Wegener, was invited by the Prime Minister James Callaghan to meet senior SAS officers 
at 10 Downing Street on 14 October 1977.57 When the German commandos successfully stormed 
Flight 181 and freed its passengers at Mogadishu airport four days later, they were accompanied 
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by two soldiers from 22SAS armed with concussion (‘stun’) grenades which were used to 
disorient the Palestinian gunmen during the assault.58 The UK government’s concerns over 
retaliatory hijackings against British commercial aircraft meant that 22SAS’s assistance to the 
Germans remained secret,59 although the MOD was still subsequently inundated with requests 
from foreign governments for assistance and training after Mogadishu.60  
 
 The MOD insisted that it could not meet every request from allied governments for 
assistance in training their special forces whilst keeping the Pagoda troop operational, and that 
22SAS could only provide the personnel required for just six overseas training missions. EEC 
member states were given priority for training, and both the Italians and French sent delegations 
to Hereford, whilst the Netherlands special forces were invited to use the British Army’s Close 
Quarter Battle range at Lydd and Hythe – the Dutch also had considerable expertise responding to 
terrorist attacks in the Netherlands which the British were keen to learn from. The MOD also 
developed liaison relationships with the US Army (which established its Delta Force in 1978), 
and also Commonwealth partners such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Lesser priorities 
included Japan, Portugal and Greece (the latter two being both new democracies and potential 
EEC members), and also Arab allies such as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. It is worth 
noting that British officials concluded that sharing tactics and weaponry – particularly the ‘stun 
grenades’ – for foreign special forces units was of minimal utility without advice on crisis 
management procedures, negotiating techniques, police command and control, and also guidance 
on how to process intelligence and manage communications in an emergency situation. The 
Home Office in particular stressed that ‘it is in our interests to respond helpfully to requests for 
assistance, though not to tout for custom or set ourselves up as world experts in counter-
terrorism’, not least because the UK lacked the resources to do the latter.61 
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There was also one other potential partner which possessed considerable practical 
expertise in counterterrorism, but where co-operation was politically sensitive. Following the 
Sayeret Matkal’s successful rescue of 102 Israeli and Jewish hostages from Entebbe, Uganda (4 
July 1976) 22SAS requested a visit by one of the Israeli commandos – or a planner involved in 
the operation – to visit Hereford. The MOD and FCO approved the request, although both were 
concerned lest the visit be made public. The Entebbe operation was contentious because the 
Ugandan dictator Idi Amin had colluded with the West German and Palestinian terrorists, and the 
Israeli rescue operation was fiercely condemned by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).62 It 
also obliged the UK government to consider the possibility that a British aircraft could be 
hijacked in analogous circumstances. 
 
By December 1977 an inter-departmental Working Group on Overseas Incidents was set 
up to prepare plans (codenamed Pulpit) for a British military intervention similar to Entebbe or 
Mogadishu. These preparations also involved setting a budget aside of £600,000 for satellite 
communications for the negotiators and a 22SAS hostage rescue team.63 The group’s 
recommendations were that in the event of an overseas crisis the Foreign Secretary should chair 
COBR, although if a hijacked airplane was flown to a UK dependency the British governor was 
theoretically in charge; the crown colony of Hong Kong had already raised its own police anti-
terrorist unit in 1974 with SAS assistance.64 Operation Pulpit was based on the assumption that – 
as was the case with the Somalis in Mogadishu – the host government would accept external 
intervention, which as far as British planning was concerned involved sending both a minister in 
charge of managing negotiations with the terrorists, and an SAS contingent of up to 40 soldiers 
ready to recover hostages by force. The problem was that potential hijackers were likely to order 
the aircrew of a captured plane to land in a state hostile to the UK, and whilst the British armed 
forces had the capability to mount an operation similar to Entebbe, the political and diplomatic 
consequences of intervention would be potentially insurmountable. FCO officials observed that 
 19 
Kenya (which had granted the Israelis access to their airspace for their raid into Uganda) was 
ostracised by the OAU as a consequence, and neighbouring states subsequently refused to allow 
RAF aircraft carrying arms to the Kenyans over-flight rights. A mission to rescue British citizens 
held by terrorists overseas would not only be thwarted if a regime like Amin’s collaborated with 
the hijackers, but if other states refused to give the UK permission to use their airspace.65  
 
During the late 1970s the British conducted at least two exercises to prepare for an 
overseas emergency (one using the Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus), but in reality any crisis 
similar to Entebbe would have posed an unsolvable dilemma. The government would have faced 
public condemnation if it was unable to rescue British hostages, but as one senior Cabinet Office 
official noted, ‘there are probably only a few places where intervention would be acceptable on 
political terms and realistic and practical in terms of our capacity to intervene’.66 The UK and 
other Western states were dependent almost entirely on the policies (and often the whims) of 
national authorities as far as hijacked aircraft were concerned. The Somali President Siad Barre 
invited GSG-9 to Mogadishu because he had broken alliance ties with the Soviet bloc as a 
consequence of Somalia’s invasion of Ethiopia (July 1977), and was desperate to curry favour 
with the West. Had Lufthansa 181 been hijacked prior to the Somali-Ethiopian war it is likely that 
Barre would have refused to assist the Germans with its rescue mission.67 
 
 
Domestic political implications: 
 
During the mid-1970s there profound concerns expressed in parliament and the press regarding 
the consequences of counterterrorism for both civil liberties and the constitutional order. The 
increased prominence of armed police aroused fears that mainland constabularies were evolving 
into a ‘third force’, or a gendarmerie, whilst the opaque role of Special Branch units in ‘counter-
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subversion’ also raised the prospect that the anti-terrorist effort could end up targeting non-
violent political activists.68 Concerns over the military’s increased role in domestic security were 
more prominent amongst left-leaning Labour MPs, journalists and trade unionists.69 Officials in 
Whitehall misjudged the extent to which measures justified as protecting the British public from 
terrorist atrocities could be interpreted in a less benign manner. Civil servants on the Working 
Group on Terrorist Activities confidently noted in October 1972 that after Munich: 
 
There would be a positive advantage in letting it be known that special precautions were 
being taken against terrorism … It would be a novelty in Great Britain for soldiers to be used 
armed force in aid of the civil power in this way. But a clear distinction can be drawn 
between the use of military power to suppress civil disorder and the use of troops against 
terrorists, and we think that the latter would be generally accepted and welcomed by public 
opinion.70 
 
 
Yet for some there was no ‘clear distinction’ between anti-terrorism and domestic repression, 
particularly in the context of the political and economic turmoil of the 1970s. The worsening 
conflict in Northern Ireland, the furore arising from ‘Bloody Sunday’ (30 January 1972), the 
industrial disputes and the economic recession that followed the Yom Kippur war and the Arab 
oil embargo (October 1973), and Harold Wilson’s sudden resignation as prime minister (April 
1976) provoked concerns that British democracy was under threat, and that the UK could suffer a 
military takeover similar to Greece (1967) and Chile (1973).71 The Army’s apparent estrangement 
from civil society, and the publication of Low Intensity Operations by General Frank Kitson (who 
subsequently commanded 39 Brigade in Belfast) in 1971, aroused fears even within the moderate 
left that the military tactics used against both the Provisional IRA and demonstrators in Northern 
Ireland could be employed against ‘subversives’ on the mainland.72   
 
 The repeated implementation of Operation Marmion therefore provoked press discussion 
in the summer of 1974 on whether the Army was preparing for a military takeover; the fact that 
Lord Chalfont, a former Labour minister, expressed such sentiments showed that coup-talk was 
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not confined to the political fringe.73 The political activities of Colonel David Stirling (the 
founder of the SAS) and General Sir Walter Walker (the former Commander in Chief of Allied 
Forces in Northern Europe) fuelled rumours of ‘private armies’ training for a putsch. Walker’s 
own claims to the press about the scale of support for his ‘Civil Assistance’ movement – and his 
bombastic references to Communist subversives undermining Britain from within – led even 
Wilson to wonder if there was support for a coup within the armed forces. Roy Mason, the 
Defence Secretary, wrote to the prime minister in early September 1974 to assure him that 
Walker did not speak for serving officers, and certainly not the Chief of the General Staff, 
General Sir Peter Hunt.74 Given Wilson’s own well-documented paranoia about right-wing 
plotting,75 it is possible that he did not accept Mason’s assurances, or for that matter General 
Hunt’s.  
 
  There were more sober appraisals suggesting that the British Army were unlikely to 
follow the example of Augusto Pinochet or the Greek ‘colonels’. Adam Roberts, a Professor at 
the London School of Economics, noted that of the soldiers he had met in his research on civil-
military relations he ‘encountered no sign of a movement of opinion tending to advocate or 
tolerate direct political intervention in domestic affairs’. The officer corps were certainly 
conservative in character, but were also scornful of retired ‘blimps’ like Walker, and in any case 
involvement in a coup would have involved violating the oath of attestation that soldiers swear to 
the Crown. Whatever army officers felt about trade unionists and industrial action, there was also 
no appetite for involvement in strike-breaking.76 As the decade progressed, the coup fears of the 
mid-1970s gradually faded, inspiring the kind of mockery seen in the 1976 television comedy The 
Fall and Rise of Reggie Perrin.77 Nonetheless, currently there are pronounced concerns over the 
implications of militarising the police, and of involving the armed forces in domestic security, 
even in conditions of comparative constitutional stability.78 In the turbulent political and socio-
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economic conditions of forty years ago the government’s response to Munich and similar 
atrocities aroused genuine fears for the future of British democracy.   
 
 
Conclusions: 
 
The counter-terrorist planning of the 1970s was tested when six ethic Arab gunmen took over the 
Iranian Embassy in London on 30 April 1980. In retrospect there is little to fault COBR’s crisis 
management, the Metropolitan Police’s containment and negotiations process, or 22SAS’s assault 
on the building, although with the latter critics question whether excessive force was applied 
during an attack in which five of the hostage-takers were killed.79 However, the Iranian Embassy 
siege was a domestic one where the British authorities were able to control the course of events, 
rather than an overseas one similar to the hostage crisis involving TWA Flight 847 in Beirut (June 
1985) or the Achille Lauro hijacking (7-8 October 1985).80 The UK was therefore not really 
tested during this period by similar emergencies that could have exposed shortcomings in both 
contingency planning and national military and police capabilities, in much the same way that 
Britain today has yet to experience an equivalent of the Mumbai attack of November 2008, or the 
Nairobi shopping mall atrocity of September 2013.81 
 
The enduring relevance of the counterterrorist planning of the 1970s can be seen with the 
co-ordinating role that COBR played during the al-Qaeda attack on the Algerian gas facilities at 
In Amenas in January 2013 (where British citizens were amongst those taken hostage), and also 
with the RAF’s Quick Reaction Force of fighter jets, placed on standby not only for traditional air 
defence patrols, but for a scenario similar to 9/11. In the later case, COBR has run rehearsals to 
prepare ministers for the likelihood that they may have to authorise the shooting down of hijacked 
passenger planes, to prevent suicide attacks similar to those which struck New York and 
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Washington DC on 11 September 2001.82 Operation Marmion and other plans to deploy troops as 
a deterrent against a terrorist attack also established a precedent for the use of the British armed 
forces in a security role during the London Olympics of 2012. The use of the military to pre-empt 
an al-Qaeda attack on the games was criticised as an over-reaction to terrorism, but it also 
highlighted a point that the Times journalist Robert Fisk offered after the Heathrow deployments 
forty years ago – when a state repeatedly calls out the troops to protect public buildings and 
public events, how does it de-escalate its security measures?83 
 
 Some of the contingency plans that followed the Munich massacre overemphasised the 
nature of the international terrorist threat, particularly as far as maritime counterterrorism was 
concerned. As was tragically demonstrated on 9/11, passenger jets can be easily hijacked if 
airport security at departure is lax enough to permit skyjackers to smuggle weapons aboard a 
plane, and if there two or more armed individuals willing to take the passengers and crew 
hostage. An operation to capture a liner or a merchant vessel is a more complicated endeavour, 
and the capture of an oil or gas rig in particular would need the type of training and equipment 
(such as helicopters or trained frogmen) often associated more with a military special forces unit 
than non-state actors. This is why maritime terrorist attacks (as opposed to acts of piracy such as 
those witnessed off the coast of Somalia) are far rarer than aircraft hijackings or attacks on land. 
Duncan Falconer, an ex-SBS operative who served during the 1970s, later noted in his memoirs 
that ‘it would take a particularly insane terrorist to try to capture a North Sea oil platform’, given 
not only the fact that the rig would be a larger and more complex target to take over than a plane 
in mid-flight or a building, but also because the ‘roughnecks’ who worked on them would also be 
truculent hostages. 84 Yet as far as officials in Whitehall were concerned, the intrinsic value of the 
North Sea oil and gas fields to the British economy justified the planning and exercises initiated 
to prepare for a contingency that their own intelligence assessments classed as improbable. 
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 Finally, it is worth noting that there are still parallels between the political conditions of 
the 1970s which shape the British government’s counterterrorist preparations and the 
contemporary environment. The sensitivity surrounding clandestine contacts with Israel show 
how diplomatically contentious international co-operation can be, and even though the ‘coup’ 
rumours of forty years ago seem absurd in retrospect, it is still important for a democratic state to 
have a frank debate about what role its armed forces should – and should not – play in counter-
terrorism, given that the military can deal with the symptoms of this problem (notably with 
hostage-rescue and deterrence operations) but not its causes. Home Office officials at that time 
were also right in stating that tactical aspects of counterterrorist assistance (such as training and 
equipment for hostage rescue units) lacked utility without overarching advice on crisis 
management and contingency planning.  
 
There are however two issues more pertinent today than four decades ago, the first being 
whether the decision-making machinery in COBR is flexible enough to deal with mass casualty 
suicide attacks similar to 9/11 or Mumbai, where the short time-span involved means that 
terrorists can seize the initiative from the authorities, forcing the latter to be as reactive as the 
Federal German and Bavarian governments were with Munich in September 1972. The second is 
that today radicalised religion – rather than radicalised politics – provides the ideological 
foundation for the trans-national terrorism of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The far-left groups of 
Europe and Japan represented a fringe within their societies, whilst the PFLP and Abu Nidal had 
a weaker support base within the Palestinian population than Fatah, which renounced terrorist 
attacks against Western countries (although not Israel) in 1974.85 In contrast, the British and other 
governments have a far harder task in ensuring that the fight against al-Qaeda does not radicalise 
the domestic Muslim community. In these two respects, the current challenges of anti-terrorism 
are distinctly different from those which inspired the establishment of COBR and the Pagoda 
troop, and the various contingency plans drafted four decades ago.   
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